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PROPOSITION 13 UNDER AN UPDATED
EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS:
UNLUCKY AT LAST?
I. INTRODUCTION
In California, property tax revenues constitute the bulk of the state's
revenue.' California's current tax scheme began in 1978 when voters
approved the constitutional amendment popularly known as Proposi-
tion 13.2 Many states employ a market value standard for computation
1. See Richard C. Reuben, Prop. 13, at 10, Said to Have Met Its Primary Goals--
But Initiative Wreaked Havoc on Budgets of County Governments-Still Controversial,
L.A. DAILY J., June 6, 1988, at 1. Proposition 13 dramatically reduced revenues com-
pared to the state's previous market value system. A former chief consultant for the
California Assembly Revenue and Taxation Committee, David Doerr estimates the rev-
enue shortfall over the decade to be $228 billion. Id.
2. CAL. CONST. art. 13A (Proposition 13) reads:
Section 1. (a) The maximum amount of any ad valorem tax on real property shall
not exceed one percent (1%) of the full cash value of such property. The one
percent (1%) tax to be collected by the counties and apportioned according to law
to the districts within the counties.
(b) The limitation provided for in subdivision (a) shall not apply to ad valorem
taxes or special assessments to pay the interest and redemption charges on... any
indebtedness approved by the voters prior [to the time this action becomes
effective].
Sec. 2. (a) The full cash value means the county assessor's valuation of real prop-
erty as shown on the 1975-76 tax bill under "full cash value" or, thereafter, the
appraised value of real property when purchased, newly constructed, or a change
in ownership has occurred after the 1975 assessment. All real property not already
assessed up to the 1975-76 full cash value may be reassessed to reflect that valua-
tion. For purposes of this section, "newly constructed" does not include real prop-
erty which is reconstructed after a disaster, as declared by the Governor, where the
fair market value of such real property, as reconstructed, is comparable to its fair
market value prior to the disaster...
(b) The full cash value base may reflect from year to year the inflationary rate
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of tax liability.3 Proposition 13, however, bases property assessments
on the acquisition price together with annual adjustments capped at
two percent.4
Since Proposition 13's enactment, inflation and appreciation have
contributed to spiraling real estate prices.5 Many properties currently
sell at two to three times their 1978 cost.6 Consequently, recent pur-
chasers pay property taxes double or more than owners who acquired
similarly situated properties only a few years ago.7 Under Proposition
not to exceed 2 percent for any given year or reduction as shown in the consumer
price index or comparable data for the area under taxing jurisdiction....
Sec. 3. From and after the effective date of this article, any changes in State taxes
enacted for the purpose of increasing revenues collected pursuant thereto whether
by increased rates or changes in methods of computation must be imposed by an
Act passed by not less than two-thirds of all members elected to each of the two
houses of the Legislature, except that no new ad valorem taxes on real property, or
sales or transaction taxes on the sales of real property may be imposed.
Sec. 4. Cities, counties and special districts, by a two-thirds vote of the qualified
electors of such district, may impose special taxes on such district, except ad
valorem taxes on real property or a transaction tax or sales tax on the sale of real
property within such City, County or special district.
Sec. 5. This article shall take effect for the tax year beginning on July 1 following
the passage of this Amendment, except Section 3 which shall become effective upon
the passage of this article.
See. 6. If any section, part, clause, or phrase hereof is for any reason held to be
invalid or unconstitutional, the remaining sections shall not be affected but will
remain in full force and effect.
CAL. CONST. art. 13A.
3. See Walter Hellerstein & James H. Peters, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Have
Far-Reaching Implications, 70 J. TAX'N 306, 309 (1989) (discussing the numerous tax-
ing jurisdictions throughout the country using the ad valorem method). See also Kris-
tine C. Karnezis, Annotation, Sale Price of Real Property as Evidence in Determining
Value for Tax Assessment Purposes, 89 A.L.R. 3D 1126 (1979) (discussing property as-
sessment issues in states utilizing market value).
4. See generally Alexander H. Pope & Charles R. Ajalat, Proposition 13 Section
2(a): Base Years, Changes of Ownership and New Construction, CAL. ST. B.J. 494 (Dec.
1979) (explaining in detail the history and future of Proposition 13).
5. One litigant in a case involving Proposition 13 alleges increases as high as 500 to
one. Nordlinger v. Lynch, 275 Cal. Rptr. 684, 687-88 (1990), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct.
49 (1991). The property owner in Nordlinger alleged a differential of 500% which re-
flected the value increase since 1975. Id.
Rapidly rising property values spurred Californians to adopt Proposition 13. See
George Lefcoe & Barney Allison, The Legal Aspects of Proposition 13: The Amador
Valley Case, 53 So. CAL. L. REV. 173, 174-76 (1979).
6. See, e.g., Nordlinger, 275 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1990). The Nordlinger taxpayer paid a
tax "nearly five times that paid by... neighbors on their comparable properties." Id. at
1267.
7. Some people claim the tax differentials are even greater than the two to three
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13, corporations, the wealthy, and long-term residents benefit at the
expense of the poor, the frequently uprooted, and first-time
homebuyers.'
All states' tax systems must conform to the fundamental protections
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.9
States, however, have long enjoyed broad discretion to design tax sys-
tems without implicating equal protection concerns. 1 In many cases,
outright discrimination is constitutionally tolerated. 1 Despite strong
challenges in California state courts, Proposition 13 has weathered sev-
eral equal protection attacks.12
times that the property costs increased. See Hallye Jordan, Hearing Examines Prop. 13
Cases, L.A. DAILY J., Dec. 6, 1989, at 4 (stating that "new homeowners are paying up
to 15 times more in property taxes than neighbors who have owned similar homes since
before the initiative passed").
Critics cite inequities of otherwise similar properties that "have property tax bills that
vary 300 or 400 percent, one [home] being owned by a longtime resident, the other by a
newcomer." Dan Walters, A Fascinating Scenario for Proposition 13, L.A. DAILY J.,
April 12, 1988, at 4.
8. See Michael S. Strimling, How Proposition 13 Distorts the Economy: Big Corpora-
tions Reap Windfalls: New Firms, Young Homeowners Suffer, L.A. DAILY J., June 17,
1991, at 6. Strimling believes that the problem is exacerbated because Proposition 13
discourages transfer of property. Id.
Proposition 13 has been credited with opening the wave of tax reform in California.
State Senator John Vasconcellos postulates that Californians have abandoned their en-
thusiasm for tax reform. See John Vasconcellos, The Tax Revolt Is Dead, CALIFORNIA
REPuBLIC, March 26, 1991, at 26.
The resulting problems caused by Proposition 13 were accurately predicted long ago:
With the passage of time, unfortunately, inequities in assessment ratios in Cali-
fornia are bound to increase, rather than diminish, under Proposition 13. This is
because realty values will certainly continue to rise at more than the two percent
maximum annual rate of increase that the law applies to valuations of those
properties which do not experience a change of ownership (or new construction).
Allen D. Manvel, Assessment Uniformity - and Proposition 13, 24 TAx NOTES 893,
895 (1984).
9. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
10. See infra notes 17-45 and accompanying text discussing the constitutionality of
state tax systems under the Equal Protection Clause.
11. Discrimination per se is not a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. See,
e.g., Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts, 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973) (upholding consti-
tutionality of tax on corporate property even though private individuals paid no taxes).
Rather, discrimination is constitutionally impermissible only if it is invidious in nature.
Id. at 359. See infra notes 17-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of permissible
classifications and applicable standards under the Equal Protection Clause.
12. Proposition 13's adoption surprised many individuals, including its sponsors,
who for years had tried to get a tax initiative on the California ballot. See Lefcoe &
Allison, supra note 5, at 174 (discussing a "volunteer army" who, on a budget of
19921
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Recently, however, the United States Supreme Court has sent signals
indicating that state tax schemes may face higher scrutiny under an
evolving equal protection analysis. 13 Some observers believe Proposi-
tion 13's days are numbered.14 For California, invalidation of Proposi-
tion 13 would have devastating consequences." Meanwhile, legislators
and planners have done little to prepare for an ominously probable
event. 16
$28,000, obtained over 1.2 million signatures to get the initiative on the ballot). Legisla-
tors had proposed tax reform initiatives every other year from 1968 to 1978. Id. at 177.
Lefcoe postulates several reasons for its eventual success in 1978. Id. at 174-78.
Californians became aware of huge surpluses, runaway local government spending and
bonding, while property taxes continued to skyrocket. Id. The governor, the legisla-
ture, and the local governments could not work out solutions to the problem. Id. at
176. Prior to the enactment of Proposition 13, California had the fourth highest prop-
erty tax burden per capita trailing behind Alaska, Massachusetts, and New Jersey. Id.
Some believe that voters did not truly understand what Proposition 13 would do. Id. at
175 n.9.
The only judicial voice of dissent against Proposition 13 has come from Chief Justice
Rose Bird in a 1978 opinion. See Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State
Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281, 1302 (Cal. 1978) (Bird, C.J., dissenting). See infra
note 61 and accompanying text for an excerpt from Chief Justice Bird's opinion.
13. The Court granted certiorari in a recent case involving Proposition 13. R.H.
Macy Co. v. Contra Costa County, 276 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct.
2256, cert. dismissed, 111 S. Ct. 2923 (1991). The petitioner voluntarily withdrew
under heavy pressure from interest groups unhappy with Macy's stores' potential role in
facilitating the demise of Proposition 13. See Richard C. Reuben, Proposition 13 Up in
Air After Macy's Retreat, L.A. DAILY J., June 11, 1991, at 7. Customers threatened
Macy's stores with a boycott. Id. The firm evidently chose to withdraw its petition
rather than risk the loss of public good will. Id. Macy's appeal also generated enor-
mous criticism from within the business community. See Michael S. Strimling, How
Proposition 13 Distorts the Economy: Big Corporations Reap Windfalls; New Firms,
Young Homeowners Suffer, L.A. DAILY J., June 17, 1991, at 6. Many believe that cor-
porations have the most to lose should Proposition 13 land on the scrap heap. Strimling
suggests that the success achieved by Apple Computer Company could not happen in
today's tax climate. Id. He also argues that while corporations as a whole have benefit-
ted, out-of-state corporations in particular have reaped windfalls. Id.
Attorney Charles J. Ajalat, representing a litigant who had challenged Proposition 13
on constitutional grounds earlier this year, argues that the United States Supreme Court
would be interested in the issue because it recently has "had a line of cases in which they
took a broader view of the equal protection clause than they have historically." Hallye
Jordan, Proposition 13 Cases Rejected, L.A. DAILY J., March 1, 1991, at 3.
14. See, e.g., Ready for the Post-Prop. 13 Era?, L.A. DAILY J., May 14, 1991, at 6.
15. The tax collection process occurs on an ongoing basis. When Proposition 13
passed on June 4, 1978, government officials had to scramble to implement the new
system. See Lefcoe & Allison, supra note 5, at 178.
16. In the last several months, attention has focused more intensely on alternatives
as it appears more likely that the Supreme Court will rule on Proposition 13.
Nordlinger v. Lynch, 275 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1990), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 49 (1991).
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II. HISTORY
A. Traditional Analysis Under the Equal Protection Clause
State tax systems have always enjoyed a strong presumption of con-
stitutionality. 7 Only rarely has the Supreme Court invalidated a tax
system under equal protection review. 8 State tax schemes, like most
economic legislation, receive a deferential review unless a fundamental
interest has been implicated.19 Over the years, the Court has formu-
lated three situations by which a state's property tax can constitution-
ally run aground against Fourteenth Amendment protections.
First, a state's choice of classifications requires application of a fairly
lenient arbitrary and capricious standard.20 States can and often do
One recent article outlines three proposals unveiled in June 1991, by a special senate
commission. See Hallye Jordan, Panel Offers Alterations to Prop. 13, L.A. DAILY J.,
June 14, 1991, at 2. All three proposals rely on a return to a market-based system. Id.
The first proposal suggests a phase-in from Proposition 13's dated purchase value sys-
tem; the second an increase from $7,000 to $50,000 per year for the homeowner exemp-
tion; the third would create a split-roll tax between homeowners and commercial
owners. Id.
California's lawmakers, constrained under the present system, would likely relish the
opportunity to rework the tax scheme. See Richard C. Reuben, Prop. 13 Up in Air After
Macy's Retreat, L.A. DAILY J., June 11, 1991, at 5. The state senate has done a study
to determine "what life would be like if [Proposition 13] were struck." Id. Arthur
Laffer, an economist, suggests elimination of the property tax altogether. See Ready for
the Post-Prop. 13 Era?, L.A. DAILY J., May 14, 1991, at 6. Laffer proposes a flat in-
come tax rate of 6.1% of income. Id. That proposal, one of a few publicly aired, gar-
nered applause from the Contra Costa Time. Id.
17. See, e.g., Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 529 (1959) (holding that state
legislatures need not state an explicit purpose due to presumption that purposes of tax
assessment are valid).
18. For recent examples, see Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n,
488 U.S. 336, 343 (1989) (rejecting property tax as applied by county assessor); Hooper
v. Bernadillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 619-20 (1985) (striking down a residence
requirement for property tax exemption for veterans).
Prior to Allegheny, the Court had not invalidated a tax scheme specifically on equal
protection grounds since 1933. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 534 (1933)
(rejecting state tax favoring proprietors who own only one store).
19. The standard is also known as the "rational basis" approach. See Robert J.
Glennon, Taxation and Equal Protection, 58 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 261, 281-82 (1990).
Even when rational basis scrutiny is appropriate, the intensity of the standard can vary
depending on the justice. See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449
U.S. 166, 183-84 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Gerald Gunther, Foreword:
In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for Newer Equal Protec-
tion, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 1-24 (1972) (examining equal protection methodologies and a
proposal for a standard with more bite).
20. See Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U.S. 563, 573 (1910) ("If the selection
1992]
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choose to divide property types into different classes and apply varying
tax rates.21 The Clause permits resultant inequities where those divi-
sions and burdens attain reasonableness.22 Typically, the state proffers
a rational basis for the classification based on a policy or a difference
between classifications.23 For example, a state may distinguish prop-
erty held by a corporation from property held by an individual and
apply different tax rates.24 Tax classifications supported by reasonable
distinctions rarely fail to meet the generous arbitrary and capricious
standard.25
Second, the Fourteenth Amendment requires that states avoid inten-
tional and systematic discrimination within a given classification.26
Ongoing, inequitable taxation imposed discriminately within a classifi-
cation raises the specter of an equal protection violation.27 Not all dis-
crepancies in tax treatment evoke equal protection problems. 28
Discrimination resulting from occasional errors or mistakes in judg-
ment is constitutionally permissible.29 Whether a claim survives de-
pends on whether the state has attained some seasonable equality in the
treatment of similarly situated taxpayers.30
or classification is neither capricious nor arbitrary, and rests upon some reasonable con-
sideration of difference or policy, there is no denial of the equal protection of the law.").
21. See, e.g., Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973)
(approving scheme under the Equal Protection Clause whereby corporate property was
taxed, while private property was not taxed).
22. Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1959) (allowing "the flexibility
and variety that are appropriate to reasonable schemes of state taxation").
23. Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U.S. 563, 573 (1910) (holding that there is
no denial of equal protection if the "classification is neither capricious nor arbitrary and
rests upon some reasonable consideration of difference or policy").
24. Lehnhausen, 410 U.S. at 365.
25. The tax scheme must fail the rationality test before being judged arbitrary and
capricious. See Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U.S. 146, 159-60 (1930) (holding that a
scheme fails rationality test only if "palpably" arbitrary).
26. Charleston Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Alderson, 324 U.S. 182, 190-91
(1945). See also Coulter v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 196 U.S. 599, 607 (1905) (hold-
ing that before a federal court may enjoin a state tax on grounds of inequality of valua-
tion, claimant must show that inequality is systematic and intentional).
27. Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1959).
28. See, e.g., Allegheny, 488 U.S. 633 (1989).
29. Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350, 353 (1918) (holding that a
state must intentionally violate the essential principal of uniformity); Coulter v. Louis-
ville & Nashville R.R., 196 U.S. 599, 607 (1905) (holding that a claimant must make a
showing that inequality was systematic and intentional).
30. 488 U.S. 336, 344 (1989); 358 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1959).
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Finally, a state's tax scheme must avoid impermissible interference
with the right to interstate travel. This Fourteenth Amendment stipu-
lation applies to statutes that discriminate between in-state residents
and non-residents.3" In the 1980's, the Court decided a trilogy of inter-
state right to travel cases. The Court found violations of the right to
interstate travel in each case.32
In Zobel v. Williams,33 an Alaska statute required distribution of
state oil proceeds to bona fide residents.34 Distributions varied accord-
ing to the citizen's length of residency since 1959. 3' The state argued
that the plan encouraged migration to and settlement in the state.3 6
The state also suggested that the plan rewarded Alaskans for past con-
tributions. 37 The Court rejected each rationalization while purportedly
relying on a minimal rationality standard.3 8
Two subsequent decisions delivered the same result. In Hooper v.
Bernalillo County Assessor,39 a New Mexico statute granted a small
property tax exemption to veterans who became residents prior to May
8, 1976. 40 Without attempting heightened scrutiny, the Court found
the statute in conflict with the Equal Protection Clause.41
The Court's third decision, in Attorney General v. Soto-Lopez4 2 also
found a state statute in violation of the right to travel. In Soto-Lopez,
New York provided hiring preferences to veterans.43 These benefits
accrued only to veterans who had lived in New York prior to induction
into the military." The Court struck down the statute and observed
that the right to travel protects residents of a particular state from ad-
31. See infra notes 32-45 and accompanying text for discussion of current right to
travel issues.
32. See Attorney General v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986); Hooper v. Bernalillo
County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982). See also
infra notes 33-45 and accompanying text reviewing these cases.
33. 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
34. Id. at 57.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 61 & n.7.
37. 457 U.S. at 61 & n.7.
38. Id. at 62-63.
39. 472 U.S. 612 (1985).
40. Id. at 614 & n.2.
41. Id. at 621-23.
42. 476 U.S. 898 (1986).
43. Id. at 900 & n.1.
44. Id.
1992]
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verse and differential treatment, compared to other residents of that
state, based solely on the timing of their negotiation.45
B. Proposition 13
Proposition 13 revolutionized modem tax reform and created na-
tional headlines when it secured ballot space in California's 1978 elec-
tion.46  Disenchanted with runaway tax assessments tied to
skyrocketing property values, voters overwhelmingly approved the
constitutional amendment.47 Proposition 13 freezes assessment values
at 1975 prices but allows 2% maximum annual adjustments.48 Reap-
praisal occurs only when property changes hands.49 In the first year
alone, Proposition 13 saved taxpayers (and cost the state treasury) five
billion dollars.5" Despite the big taxpayer savings, Proposition 13 soon
came under legal attack.
45. Id. at 904.
46. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text describing the circumstances that
spawned Proposition 13.
47. Voters approved the measure by a margin of two-to-one. See Lefcoe & Allison,
supra note 5, at 174.
48. See supra note 2 for text of Proposition 13.
49. See supra note 2 for text of Proposition 13. Reappraisal occurs when property
has been purchased, newly constructed, or there has been a change in ownership. CAL.
CONST. art. 13A § 2(a).
Proposition 13 left open many questions subsequently decided by the California
courts. In Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v. State Bd. of Equaliza-
tion, 583 P.2d 1281, 1294 (Cal. 1978) (en banc), the California Supreme Court upheld
the measure's validity against federal equal protection challenges. See infra notes 51-61
and accompanying test for a discussion of the Amador Valley case. Other decisions
construing language in Proposition 13 include San Francisco v. Farrell, 648 P.2d 935,
940 (Cal. 1982) (stating that special taxes mean taxes levied for a specific purpose rather
than taxes used for general governmental purposes); Carman v. Alvord, 644 P.2d 192,
196-97 (Cal. 1982) (observing that the public employee retirement fund liability is a
debt for purposes of Proposition 13); Los Angeles County Transp. Comm'n v. Rich-
mond, 643 P.2d 941, 947 (Cal. 1982) (noting that two-thirds vote requirement for addi-
tional tax increases does not apply to a vote on a sales tax increase); County of Fresno v.
Malmstrom, 156 Cal. Rptr. 777, 781 (1979) (stating that one percent maximum tax
limitation on ad valorem taxes does not apply to special assessments, which therefore
are outside Proposition 13's limits).
50. See Lefcoe & Allison, supra note 5, at 178. The overall savings over the first ten
years approach $230 billion. See Richard C. Reuben, Prop. 13, at 10, Said to Have Met
Its Primary Goals-But Initiative Wreaked Havoc on Budgets of County Governments-
Still Controversial, L.A. DAILY J., June 6, 1988, at 1. But see Lewis K. Uhler, The Tax
Revolt is Alive and Well, CALIFORNIA RFPUBLIC, March 26, 1991, at 27. According to
the article, California has several options available to limit its need for additional funds.
Id. The author estimates that the state can raise $4 to $5 billion. Id. at 28.
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C. Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v. State Board
of Education
Immediately after enactment, Proposition 13 faced legal opposition
on federal and state constitutional claims."1 In Amador Valley Joint
Union High School District v. State Board of Education, 2 the Califor-
nia high court upheld Proposition 13's validity against a federal equal
protection charge.5
3
The Amador Valley petitioners included the school district, the
County of Alameda, and the City and County of San Francisco.54
Seeking a declaratory judgment, they contended that the 1975 rollback
provisions would result in invidious discrimination between owners of
similarly situated property.55 They further argued that Proposition 13
had not established classifications. 56 The petitioners believed that the
lack of classifications caused the tax scheme to fall below equal protec-
tion standards. 57 The California court, however, considered the system
in a different light.58 The court avoided deciding whether the scheme
involved classifications and instead found any speculative disparities in
tax treatment the result of the owner's choice to purchase on a given
date.59 Thus, the court concluded that because tax rates based on ac-
quisition value withstood a rational basis review, Proposition 13 sur-
vived equal protection attack.' Chief Justice Rose Bird dissented.
She did not accept the majority's rational basis approach which, in ef-
51. Proposition 13 was passed in June 1978. The California Supreme Court ren-
dered an opinion by September 22, 1978. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist.
v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281 (1978) (en bane).
52. 583 P.2d 1281 (Cal. 1978) (en bane).
53. Id. at 1302. The California court addressed several other issues the petitioners
raised. These challenges involved state constitutional law. The California court re-jected these attacks, holding (1) the voter initiative was not a constitutional revision; (2)
matters encompassed by the initiative sufficiently met the state's requirement that initia-
tives only embrace a "single-subject;" and (3) the special requirement of a two-thirds
vote to approve local taxation was not constitutionally infirm. Id. at 1283-95.
54. Id. at 1283. The court noted the abundance of support for petitioners. Among
them were several governmental agencies and concerned citizens. Id.
55. Id. at 1292.
56. 583 P.2d at 1292.
57. Id. at 1293.
58. Id. The court conveniently equated tax classifications with tax disparities. Id.
59. Id.
60. 583 P.2d at 1294. The court stated that later purchasers would be assessed "in
precisely the same manner as those who purchased in 1975" which justified a rational
1992]
Washington University Open Scholarship
442 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 42:433
feet, favored one class of owners over another.61
D. Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission
In 1989 the United States Supreme Court cast new doubt on Propo-
sition 13's constitutionality with a decision involving a West Virginia
tax scheme.62 Two coal companies in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v.
County Commission 63 alleged an equal protection violation over gross
disparities between taxes assessed on their recently purchased proper-
ties and those assessed on nearby property not recently transferred. 64
West Virginia's constitution does not provide for separate classifica-
tions of corporately owned land.65 The state required uniform taxation
of all real estate in proportion to value.6 6 The county assessor, how-
ever, followed an ad hoc procedure which allowed huge disparities to
develop in tax assessment of comparable property.67
The county assessed property on the basis of deed consideration.68
basis standard because the acquisition price reflected the owner's "voluntary acts of
purchase." Id. at 1293.
An often overlooked aspect of Amador Valley concerned the political sentiment that
must have affected the California Supreme Court. Voters elect California's supreme
court justices; four on the Amador Valley court faced election in November 1978. See
Lefcoe & Allison, supra note 5, at 174. The court rendered its decision in September,
1978. All four justices were confirmed. Id. However, Chief Justice Rose Bird, the lone
dissenter, gained re-election with 52.5% of the vote, representing the closest vote in the
history of confirmation elections. d.
61. Id. at 1303-04. Chief Justice Bird added:
As judges we must be devoted to the preservation of the great constitutional princi-
ples which history had bequeathed to us. In article XIIIA, one of those principles
has been violated - the equal protection clause. No one mindful of this nation's
colonial history can seriously question the right of the people to act to redress tax
grievances. However, our citizens also have a right to be treated equally before the
law. The right to equality of taxation is as basic to our democracy as is the right to
representation in matters of taxation. Under article XIIIA property taxpayers are
not treated equally and those sections which promote this disparity must fall.
Id. at 1303 (Bird, C. J., dissenting).
62. West Virginia's supreme court held, by a three-to-two margin, that the scheme
had not violated the constitution. In re 1975 Tax Assessments Against Oneida Coal
Co., 360 S.E.2d 560 (W. Va. 1987), rev'd sub nom. Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v.
County Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336 (1989).
63. 488 U.S. 336 (1989).
64. Id. at 339-40.
65. Id. at 344-45.
66. Id. at 338.
67. 488 U.S. at 338-39.
68. Id. at 340.
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Consequently, property that infrequently changed hands remained on
the tax rolls at low values.69 Although the infrequently transferred
property was subject to adjustments, the assessor had managed only
three ten percent increases in the prior fifteen years.70 Market values
for all property had leaped in value during that same period.71
The Webster County officials mustered an extremely weak re-
sponse.' The Supreme Court unanimously held that the county's sys-
tem violated the Equal Protection Clause.73  Because the state
elucidated no clear classification and seasonable attainment of inequi-
ties had not occurred, the Court judged the disparate tax burdens on
the basis of intentional and systematic discrimination.74 Noting that
tax rate differentials were not likely to converge and that discrepancies
in tax assessments were as high as thirty-five to one, the Court had no
trouble concluding that the scheme fell below the standard." In its
last footnote, the Court explicitly referred to Proposition 13 but added
that it did not, nor did it have to, decide that measure's validity with its
Allegheny ruling.76
69. Id.
70. Id. at 338.
71. 488 U.S. at 338.
72. One commentator goes as far as saying "[i]f the battle between the competing
lawyers in Allegheny had been a prize fight, the referee would have stopped it." Glen-
non, supra note 19, at 272-73 (1990). Professor Glennon summed up his assessment of
the tax assessor's counsel: "Allegheny unfortunately illustrates the dilemma that arises
when the government attorney lacks persuasive powers. The failure of counsel for the
County to assert any plausible reason for the Assessor's action resulted in the practice
being found unconstitutional." Id. at 301.
73. 488 U.S. at 342-43.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 344-46.
76. Id. at 344-45 n.4. That footnote reads:
We need not and do not decide today whether the Webster County assessment
method would stand on a different footing if it were the law of a State, generally
applied, instead of the aberrational enforcement policy it appears to be. The State
of California had adopted a similar policy as Article XIIIA of its Constitution,
popularly known as 'Proposition 13.' Proposition 13 generally provides that prop-
erty will be assessed at its 1975-1976 value, and reassessed only when transferred,
constructed upon, or, in a limited manner for inflation. Cal. Const., Art. XIIIA,
§ 2 (limiting inflation adjustments to 2% per year.) [sic] The system is grounded
on the belief that taxes should be based on the original cost of property and should
not tax unrealized paper gains in the value of the property.
Id.
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III. RECENT DEVELOPMENT
Allegheny quickly generated new litigation and discussion over Prop-
osition 13's viability. Prior to Allegheny, Proposition 13 appeared to
have become impervious to any federal incongruities." Observers of
Allegheny accurately predicted the result but in Allegheny's aftermath
few commentators have taken note of its potential impact on Proposi-
tion 13."M Even more astonishing is the lack of responsible planning by
California politicians and citizens for alternative tax systems.79
A. R.H. Macy Co. v. Contra Costa County
In March of 1989 in R.!- Macy Co. v. Contra Costa County,8° a
national department store raised equal protection allegations involving
Macy's property tax reassessment under Proposition 13. Macy's
owned a portion of a shopping center in Contra Costa County.8' Be-
cause the company underwent a corporate restructuring, the title
change triggered reassessment required by Proposition 13.82 Macy's
argued that Allegheny applied to Proposition 13 and required a "sea-
sonable attainment of rough equality."' 83 According to Macy's, that
goal had not and could not be met under Proposition 13. The Califor-
nia court rejected this challenge. The court noted that the Supreme
77. Until the Allegheny decision, Amador Valley effectively barred any subsequent
challenges to Proposition 13 based on the Equal Protection Clause. See supra notes 51-
61 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Amador Valley case.
In addition, federal law has helped shield Proposition 13 from challenges in federal
court. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988) (not allowing federal jurisdiction over a challenge to a
state tax scheme unless the litigant has exhausted all state appeals).
78. At least two law review commentaries have undertaken an evaluation of Alle-
gheny's potential effects on Proposition 13. See Glennon, supra note 19, at 290-306
(focusing analysis on Allegheny, devoting last part of article to effects on Proposition
13); Marian A. Harvey, Note, Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission of
Webster County: Equal Protection in Property Taxation, A New Challenge To Proposi-
tion 13?, 26 SAN DiEGo L. REv. 1173 (1989) (comparing West Virginia's scheme to
Proposition 13).
79. California's senate has commissioned one study to the impact if the legislature
repealed Proposition 13. See Richard C. Reuben, Proposition 13 Up in Air After Macy's
Retreat, L.A. DAILY J., June 11, 1991, at 7.
80. 276 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
81. Id. at 532-33. Macy's apparently owned the portion used by its store within the
shopping mall. Id. The property had been controlled through subsidiaries, Concord
Properties Corp. and Macy's of California, Inc. Id. at 532.
82. Id. at 533.
83. Id. (quoting Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336,
343 (1989)).
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Court explicitly refused to rule on the constitutionality of Proposition
13." The California court also distinguished Allegheny on the basis of
Allegheny's extreme disparities in tax assessments.8 5 For further em-
phasis, the Macy court cited the different standards of value used under
West Virginia's tax scheme and Proposition 13.86
The Macy court refused to decide whether Proposition 13 implicitly
or explicitly designated classifications.8 7 Instead, the court, relying on
Amador Valley, found that any inequities which may have resulted
from the classification were an inevitable result of the rational scheme
furthered by legitimate state objectives. 8
The California Supreme Court refused Macy's appeal.89 Having ex-
hausted state court remedies, Macy's filed a petition for a writ of certi-
orari with the United States Supreme Court in early 1990.' o The Court
granted the writ and both parties filed briefs and prepared for oral ar-
guments in mid-June of 1990. Shortly before oral arguments, Macy's
succumbed to angry supporters of Proposition 13 and withdrew its
petition.9 1
B. Nordlinger v. Lynch
Another Proposition 13 challenge came before a California appellate
court. Nordlinger v. Lynch involved a homeowner who raised her own
Allegheny challenges.92
In Nordlinger, an attorney purchased a California home on Novem-
ber 1, 1988 for $170,000. 93 Her subsequent tax bill showed adjustment
84. 276 Cal. Rptr. 530, 538 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
85. Id. at 539. Macy's also raised a challenge based on the right to interstate travel.
Id. at 540. The court rejected that claim. Id. at 541.
86. Id. at 537-38.
87. Id. at 538.
88. 276 Cal. Rptr. 530, 539 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
89. 1991 Cal. LEXIS 943 (Cal. 1991). See Hallye Jordan, Prop. 13 Cases Rejected,
L.A. DAILY J., March 1, 1991, at 3. Macy's attorney, Charles R. Ajalat, predicted that
the United States Supreme Court would hear the case because "[tihat's where the action
has been anyway." Id.
90. R. H. Macy & Co. v. Contra Costa County, 276 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 2256, cert. dismissed, 111 S. Ct. 2923 (1991).
91. The public's reaction indicated the emotional volatility involved with Proposi-
tion 13. See Richard C. Reuben, Prop. 13 Up in Air After Macy's Retreat, L.A. DAILY
J., June 11, 1991, at 7 (discussing the reasons Macy's withdrew its petition).
92. 275 Cal. Rptr. 684 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 49 (1991).
93. Id. at 687. Nordlinger recently took her case to the press:
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reflecting the new purchase price. Ms. Nordlinger then learned that
two neighbors with nearly identical properties paid taxes on assessed
values of $35,850 and $36,107."4 Although all three properties ap-
peared to be similar, Nordlinger received a tax bill five times higher
than her neighbors."
The lower court ruled that Amador Valley controlled despite Alle-
gheny and sustained a demurrer.9 6 The California Court of Appeal for
the Second District affirmed.9 7 Rather than rely on Allegheny to strike
down Proposition 13, the court of appeals closely followed the Amador
Valley analysis.9" According to the Nordlinger court, a system based
on acquisition cost bears a reasonable relationship to valid state goals
A Los Angeles homeowner angry her property taxes are up to five times what
her neighbors pay hopes the U. S. Supreme Court... will agree to consider her
challenge to California's landmark Proposition 13.
Attorney Stephanie Nordlinger's case challenges the 1978 initiative's provision
that provides for tax reassessment at current market value when a home is
purchased or new construction occurs. She is also challenging the 2 percent annual
limit on increases in a property's assessed value under current ownership. Those
portions of the tax reform initiative are referred to as the 'welcome stranger' provi-
sions.
"I filed [my lawsuit] because it's unfair for me to pay five times as much taxes as
my neighbors," Nordlinger said.
Nordlinger ... paid $170,000 for her house in.. .November 1988. Her property
taxes for 1989 were $1,700, while many of her neighbors who had lived there
longer only paid $350, she said.
"It's a denial of equal protection of the laws," she said. "I get the same services
as everyone else. Why should I pay five times more taxes than everyone else?"
Lauren Blau, Lawyer's Challenge of Prop. 13 Is Awaiting Decision by Justices, L.A.
DAiLY J., Oct. 7, 1991, at 1.
94. 275 Cal. Rptr. at 687. According to the complaint, the two other homes con-
tained more square footage. Id. The first home sits on a lot 900 square feet larger; that
home is assessed at $35,820. Id. The second comparable property has both a larger lot
(by 1,040 square feet) and greater living space (by 44 square feet). Id. Nordlinger al-
leged that her fair assessed value should be $30,000. Id.
95. Id. The prior owners of the Nordlinger property paid $121,500 for it in 1986.
Id. In 1989, shortly after the November 1988 sale, Nordlinger received a supplemental
tax bill reflecting the reassessment triggered by the change in ownership. Id.
96. Id. at 688. The lower court dismissed both of Nordlinger's causes of action. Id.
The first cause of action sought declaratory judgment declaring article XIIIA unconsti-
tutional as applied to similarly situated property owners. Id. In her second cause of
action, Nordlinger sought a tax refund of $898 in property taxes for the year 1988-89.
Id. The figure did not amount to a proportional reduction because the previous owner
paid or had already been liable for a portion of the 1988-89 tax bill. Id.
97. Id. at 698.
98. 275 Cal. Rptr. at 692. The court would not abandon loyalty to Amador Valley
unless the Supreme Court's "decision in Allegheny is directly on point." Id. at 693.
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and therefore withstands an application of the arbitrary and capricious
standard.9 9 The court distinguished Allegheny by emphasizing that
West Virginia's valuation system differed from Proposition 13.1o0 Cali-
fornia's Supreme Court denied further review."° '
On October 7, 1991, the United States Supreme Court granted
Nordlinger's petition for a writ of certiorari. 0 2 The petitioner's
first question presented will place Proposition 13's constitutionality
squarely before the Court.103
IV. EVALUATION
The Supreme Court's current direction in applying equal protection
to state tax issues has now reached a crossroads. Allegheny represents
the first use of equal protection to invalidate a state tax system since
1931. " In the future, the Court might distinguish this as an unusual
factual situation which required judicial intervention. 105 Most impor-
tantly, Allegheny signifies an aggressive use of equal protection as ap-
plied to state tax systems."
99. Id. at 694-95.
100. Id.
101. The California Supreme Court denied review on February 28, 1991. See Rich-
ard C. Reuben, Battle Over Prop. 13 Heats Up - Again, L.A. DAILY J., March 28,
1991, at 4.
102. See Richard C. Reuben, High Court to Hear Prop. 13 Challenge - Supreme
Court Has Chance to Expand Economic Rights, L.A. DAILY J., Oct. 8, 1991, at 1.
103. Nordlinger presented two questions to the Court:
(1) Does California's ad valorem property tax system as modified by Proposition
13's welcome stranger provision violate equal protection clause by taxing newly
purchased property 10, 12, 15, 17, and even 583 times higher than like property
owned by long-time owners, with no possibility of ever seasonably attaining rough
equality in tax treatment?
(2) Does the harshly disproportionate tax burden Proposition 13 imposes on recent
migrants and other newcomers impede right to travel without compelling state
purpose?
Nordlinger v. Lynch, 275 Cal. Rptr. 684 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990), cert. granted sub nom.
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 49 (1991).
104. See Cumberland Coal Co. v. Bd. of Revision, 284 U.S. 23, 28-30 (1931) (invali-
dating a Pennsylvania tax assessment plan on equal protection grounds).
105. The disparities were truly staggering. Differentials exceeded 3500%, and
based on the periodic adjustments applied to other properties, 500 years would pass
before the assessor had bridged the gap. Allegheny, 488 U.S. 336, 341-42 (1989). The
Court's analysis virtually ignored serious consideration of the tax authority's proffered
justifications. Id. at 344-46.
106. See Hallye Jordan, Prop. 13 Cases Rejected, L.A. DAILY J., March 1, 1991, at
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The trilogy of cases starting with Zobel v. Williams 0 7 portend
trouble for Proposition 13. California courts have relied heavily on the
1978 decision in Amador Valley to uphold Proposition 13's validity.01
Since Amador Valley, the right to travel analysis may have matured
into a more potent danger to Proposition 13."° For example, in
Hooper, the Court struck down a statute that involved a modest finan-
cial benefit designed to reduce veteran's property taxes. 10 Moreover,
statutes struck in Zobel, Hooper, and Soto-Lopez used arbitrary cut-off
dates quite similar to the 1975 date found in Proposition 13.111
The Court's language in Zobel extends beyond the Alaska statute
under consideration. Dictum in Zobel arguably questions Proposition
13's constitutionality. The majority opinion lashed out against Zobel-
like statutes and rhetorically asked: "Could states impose different
taxes based on length of residence?" '112 Justice Brennan, in a concur-
ring opinion, echoed similar warnings, specifically noting that the
Court, by adopting the Equal Protection Clause, has implicitly rejected
state schemes with classifications based on length of residence. 113
V. CONCLUSION
Equal protection presumes some benchmark for comparison. Before
a court may find unconstitutional discrimination, the fact finder must
place comparative values on the properties.' 14 Few would question the
3 (stating that attorney for Macy's believes the Court will invalidate Proposition 13 if
given the opportunity).
107. 457 U.S. 55 (1982). For a discussion of the three cases, see supra notes 33-45
and accompanying text.
108. See, eg., Nordlinger, 275 Cal. Rptr. 684 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990), cert. granted,
112 S. Ct. 49 (1991); Macy, 276 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
109. See supra notes 31-45 and accompanying text regarding right to travel deci-
sions. Professor Glennon believes that rather than invalidating Proposition 13 under
general equal protection analysis, the Court may hold the measure violative of the
Clause's right to interstate travel. See Glennon, supra note 20, at 294-97 (1990).
110. In Hooper, the state provided a property tax exemption for $2,000 of property
value. Hooper, 472 U.S. at 615.
111. Zobel had a cutoff date in 1959; Hooper, in 1976; and Soto-Lopez, at time of
induction. Proposition 13 establishes a cutoff date in 1975-76 as the starting point for
valuation of continuously owned real estate. For text of Proposition 13, see supra note
2 and accompanying text.
112. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 64 (1982) (footnote omitted).
113. Id. at 71.
114. Id. The problem of value cropped up in Allegheny even at the Supreme
Court's level of review. Allegheny, 488 U.S. 338-39. The County argued that values of
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market value of widely traded stock. Real estate, in contrast,, presents
the assessor with a complicated determination."X5 Until a property has
sold, appraisers rarely agree on the fair market value of the real estate
parcel. 1 6 Consequently, in tax systems based on market value, vari-
ances as much as ten to twenty percent are tolerated.
117
Proposition 13, once thought a panacea for California's tax evils,
now represents a warped and unfair tax policy."1 The vital element of
the scheme remains its reliance on acquisition value as a justifiable ba-
sis for its tax policy. The justification, however, has never had a basis
in equal protection analysis and doubtfully survives constitutional re-
comparative properties had not been definitively determined. Id. The Court, of course,
had to accept the factual findings by the trial court. Id. The County may have misdi-
rected its theory of the case and instead might have argued rational bases for its system.
See Glennon, supra note 19, at 272-75 (postulating that inadequate counsel, including
preoccupation with factual disputes, may have contributed to the result).
115. See, eg., Allen D. Manvel, Assessment Uniformiy---And Proposition 13, TAX
NoTs 893, 895 (1984) (explaining assessment level variations); Krishne C. Karnezis,
Annotation, Sale Price of Real Property as Evidence in Determining Value for Tax As-
sessment Purposes, 89 A.L.R. 3D 1126, 1131-35 (1979) (discussing difficulties with ap-
praisal values and issues that arise in that context).
See also Note, Inequality in Property Tax Assessments: New Cures for Old Ill, 75
HARv. L. Rlv. 1374, 1375-76 (1964) (documenting historic problems associated with
appraisal judgments and recourse for the taxpayer).
116. Market price alone may not establish fair market value. See, e.g., Geipel v.
Milwaukee, 229 N.W. 2d 585, 589 (Wis. 1975) (sale price of 60 acres with residence
constitutes best evidence of property's value for taxation purposes); In re Park Avenue
Corp. v. Tax Comm'n, 191 N.Y.S.2d 893, 895 (App. Div. 1959) (sale price best evidence
for property tax valuation purposes); Thaw v. Fairfield, 43 A.2d 65, 67 (Conn. 1945)
(sale price of house on acreage properly considered as a factor, but not conclusive evi-
dence). In some instances, courts have disregarded sale price altogether. See, e.g., Da-
vidson v. Lansing, 97 N.W. 2d 592, 593, 356 Mich. 697, 700 (1959) (holding that sale
price of real estate is not controlling in assessing taxes); Spear v. Bath, 130 A. 507, 509
(Me. 1925) (holding auction price is not a true criteria of the assessed valuation on
which to base taxes).
States assessing market value have grappled with other problems, such as assessors
applying ad hoc rates that leave property owners burdened, but not to the extent that
litigation would be worth the gain. See Irving I. Lesnick, Does Full Value Mean Full
Value? Prospects for Assessment Reform in New York in Light of the Experiences of
Other States With Hellerstein's Progenitors, 5 HonsrRA L. Rav. 235, 255 (1977). See
also Note, The Road to Uniformity in Real Estate Taxation: Valuation and Appeal, 124
U. PA. L. Rv. 1418 (1976) (coining the term "welcome stranger" taxation).
117. See Manvel, supra note 115, at 894 (noting that California had one of the best
assessment records prior to Proposition 13).
118. See supra note 8 and accompanying text for discussion of the winners and the
losers under Proposition 13.
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quirements today.119
Acquisition price does not, on paper, directly lead to inequity. At
the time of purchase, the price paid nearly always reflects the best esti-
mate of a property's true value.120 That figure, however, loses touch
with updated market value as market values become volatile over
time.121 When property is ultimately sold, the purchase price bears
little relevance to market value.122
California leaders recognize that a tax system purporting to fairly
allocate the assessments according to such a system makes a mockery
of fairness and equal treatment. 123 The tax system when enacted pro-
vided a temporary stay for the ills that previous tax policy had not
cured. The Supreme Court may ultimately do to Proposition 13 what
California's leaders and courts have been politically constrained from
attempting.'2 4 Even if the Court upholds Proposition 13 under the re-
cent challenges, responsible leaders and citizens should propose a ra-
tional revision to the existing system.
William C. Peper*
119. The Supreme Court apparently assumes that fairness presumptively depends
on fair market value basis as established by the fact-finder. See Allegheny, 488 U.S. at
344-45 n.4 (referencing inapplicability of the decision to Proposition 13, the Court high-
lighted the differing valuation theories).
120. In general, real estate appraisers define market value as "[t]he most probable
price which a property should bring in a competitive and open market under all condi-
tions requisite to a fair sale .... ." Fannie Mae Form 1004B (July 1986).
121. Nordlinger represents a fine example of market value volatility. The plaintiffin
Nordlinger paid taxes on $170,000 assessed value, while her neighbors, with equivalent
or better properties, paid taxes on assessed values under $37,000. Nordlinger, 275 Cal.
Rptr. at 687.
122. Id.
123. See, eg., John Vasconcellos, The Tax Revolt Is Dead, CALIFORNIA REPUBLIC,
March 26, 1991, at 26, written by a California state senator). See also Richard C. Reu-
ben, Primary Goals, supra note 1. Local governments, feeling the pinch, have attempted
to exert pressure on state legislators. Id.
124. Proposition 13 requires a two-thirds majority to amend or revise it. See supra
note 2 for text of Proposition 13.
* J.D., Washington University, 1992.
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